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The domination contract1 
Charles W. Mills*
Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988) has become a 
classic text of second-wave feminism, and is widely and deservedly 
seen as constituting one of the most important challenges of 
the last twenty-five years to the frameworks and assumptions 
of “malestream” political theory. Moreover, its influence is not 
restricted to gender issues, since it was the inspiration for my own 
book, The Racial Contract (1997), which has also become quite 
successful in the parallel, if not as well-established, field of critical 
race theory. The impact of both books, of course, originates in part 
from their refusal respectively of “pink” and “black” theoretical 
ghettoization for a frontal conceptual engagement with a (male, 
white) intellectual apparatus, social contract theory, that has 
historically been central to the modern Western political tradition, 
1 Este artigo é apresentado tal como originalmente escrito. This article is 
presented as it was originally written. Este artículo se presenta tal como fue 
escrita originalmente. Questo articolo é presentato nella stessa forma in cui é 
stato scritto. Cet article est présenté comme il a été écrit. Dieser artikel wird 
präsentiert, wie sie ursprünglich geschrieben wurde.
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of numerous journal articles and book chapters, and five books: The racial 
contract (1997); Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race (1998); From 
class to race: essays in white marxism and black radicalism (2003); Contract 
and domination – with Carole Pateman (2007); and Radical theory, caribbean 
reality: race, class and social domination (2010). He is currently working on a 
book collection of his recent articles.
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and which has been spectacularly revived in the past four decades 
as a result of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). Pateman 
and I are saying that the history of gender and racial subordination 
requires a rethinking of how we do political theory, that it cannot 
be a matter of some minor, largely cosmetic changes – a few 
“she’s” sprinkled in where there were previously only “he’s,” a 
pro forma (if that much) deploring of the racism of Enlightenment 
theorists – before continuing basically as before. As such, the goal 
is a revisioning of the tradition that we both want the white male 
majority of practitioners in the field to accept and to incorporate 
into their own work. 
What, though, is the specific nature of this challenge for 
contract theory in general, and Rawlsian normative theory in 
particular? After all, Pateman is generally represented as being quite 
hostile to the project of trying to retrieve the contract for positive 
ends. So in this and the next chapter, I want to make a case for 
generalizing this revisionist version of the contract and turning it to 
the theorization of gender and racial justice. My claim will be that 
the concept of a “domination contract” can be fruitfully employed 
to overturn the misleading framework of assumptions of mainstream 
social contract theory, thereby better positioning us to tackle the 
pressing issues of “non-ideal theory” that, far from being marginal, 
in fact determine the fate of the majority of the population.
1  THE “CONTRACT” AS PROTEAN 
Let me begin – in the “underlaborer” tradition of analytic 
philosophy – with some preliminary clarificatory distinctions. For 
if Pateman’s book has been read in divergent and contradictory 
ways, as it has, then to a significant extent this interpretive variation 
goes with the conceptual territory. There are at least three major 
sources of the ambiguities in Pateman’s revisionist contract: one 
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endemic to the literature in general, even just the mainstream 
variety; one arising distinctively from her radical and unfamiliar 
non-mainstream use of the idea; and one generated by divergences 
in terminology. 
The general problem is the astonishing range of the ways in 
which the idea of the “contract” has historically been employed, 
ironically – or then again, not ironically at all – coupled with 
the fact that in most cases it is actually doing no work, and is, 
in effect, otiose, a disposable part of the argument. (With only 
slight exaggeration, one could quip that in the long history of 
social contract theory, very few actual social contract theorists 
can be found.) 
To begin with, there is the notion of the contract as in 
some sense, whether stronger or weaker, descriptive/factual. For 
example, the contract as ur-sociology or anthropology, providing 
us with a literal account of what actually happened. Or, more 
weakly, the contract as a plausible hypothetical reconstruction of 
what might have happened. Or, more weakly still, the contract as 
a useful way of thinking about what happened – the contract “as 
if” – though we know perfectly well it did not happen that way. 
Then within this “descriptive” sense, whether robustly or thinly 
conceived, there are additional differences (cross-cutting the 
above) of, so to speak, the object of the contract. Is it a contract 
to create society, or the state, or both? And, to introduce further 
complications within these categories, is society envisaged as an 
aggregate of individuals or a transformed collective community, 
and are rights alienated to the state or merely delegated to it? 
Then there is the contract as normative. For example, the contract 
as the outcome of a collective-bargaining agreement that brings 
morality into existence as a conventionalist set of principles. Or 
the contract as a way of elucidating and codifying pre-existing 
and objective moral principles, whether grounded in natural law 
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or human interests. Or the contract as a thought-experiment, a 
device for generating moral intuitions about justice through the 
strategy of combining prudential motivation with ignorance of 
crucial features of the self. 
So the concept has been used in radically different ways 
– the contract as literal, metaphorical, historical, hypothetical, 
descriptive, prescriptive, prudential, moral, constitutional, civil, 
regulative ideal, device of representation. It is no wonder then, 
that, as David Boucher and Paul Kelly (1994b, 2) conclude in an 
introductory overview of social contract theory: “The idea of the 
social contract when examined carefully is seen to have very few 
implications, and is used for all sorts of reasons, and generates 
quite contrary conclusions.” Or as Will Kymlicka (1991, 196) 
concurs in an encyclopedia essay: “In a sense, there is no contract 
tradition in ethics, only a contract device which many different 
traditions have used for many different reasons.”
Moreover, as if this bewildering array of distinctions were 
not enough, a further complication is that Pateman’s peculiar use 
of the contract idea revives a strand of the contract tradition that 
has been so marginalized and ignored that it does not even have 
a name in the secondary literature: what I have called elsewhere 
the “domination contract” (Mills 2000). Though Pateman herself 
does not explicitly make the connection in The Sexual Contract, 
and though I have never seen them linked in discussions of her 
work, a case can be made that the “sexual contract” develops an 
idea whose nucleus is actually originally to be found in Rousseau’s 
“class contract” of his 1755 A Discourse on Inequality (1997a). 
Seven years before publishing the Social Contract (1997c), 
Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality (1997a) condemned 
and set out to explain the non-natural “political” inequalities of 
class society, which are the result of “a sort of convention,” and 
that consist in “the different Privileges which some enjoy to the 
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prejudice of the others, such as to be more wealthy, more honored, 
more Powerful than they” (131). He offered a “hypothetical and 
conditional” (132) history of technological progress in the state of 
nature, which eventually led to the development of nascent society, 
private property, growing divisions between rich and poor, and a 
state of war. In Rousseau’s reconstruction, the wealthy, alarmed 
by this threat to their property and security, promised to the poor 
new social institutions that pretended to offer justice, peace, and 
impartial social rules for the mutual benefit of all. But in actuality 
these institutions
irreversibly destroyed natural freedom, forever fixed the 
Law of property and inequality, transformed a skillful 
usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the profit of 
a few ambitious men henceforth subjugated the whole of 
Mankind to labor, servitude and misery. (173)
Rousseau’s contract is therefore a bogus contract, contract 
as scam – in the words of Patrick Riley (2001b, 4), “a kind of 
confidence trick on the part of the rich.” In its uncompromising 
demystification of the consensual illusions of mainstream 
contract theory, it anticipates by a century Marx’s later critique 
of supposedly egalitarian liberalism as a mask for the differential 
power of a capitalist ruling class. The later Social Contract, of 
course, would go on to outline an ideal contract that prescribed 
how society should be founded and what kinds of institutions 
would, through the “general will,” be necessary to achieve genuine 
political egalitarianism. But in Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau 
is describing, if only in a “hypothetical and conditional” sense 
(1997a, 132), what might actually have happened. 
The point is, then, that a clear precedent exists in the Western 
contract tradition for the idea of an exclusionary manipulative 
contract deployed by the powerful to subordinate others in society 
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under the pretext of including them as equals. Yet whether because of 
the unacceptable radicalism of the idea, its polar incongruity with a 
mainstream conception for which, underneath all the variations listed 
above, a legitimizing consensuality is the crucial common factor, 
or the brevity of his treatment, Rousseau’s first contract is hardly 
discussed in the secondary literature, whether on social contract 
theory in general or on Rousseau in particular. It is mentioned, 
for example, neither in David Boucher and Paul Kelly’s (1994a) 
anthology on social contract theory, nor in Christopher Morris’s 
(1999b) anthology, nor in Stephen Darwall’s (2003) anthology, 
nor in three encyclopedia essays on the subject (Laslett 1967; 
Kymlicka 1991; Hampton 2007). Even The Cambridge Companion 
to Rousseau (Riley 2001a) devotes only a few paragraphs to it – not 
an entire essay, nor even a sub-section of an essay. 
So given this absence of any developed analysis in the 
literature, it is perhaps less surprising that the distinctive features 
of Pateman’s “contract” should not have been recognized as 
homologous to Rousseau’s, though centered on gender rather 
than class. For in The Problem of Political Obligation (Pateman 
1979), whose subtitle is A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory, 
Pateman gives a detailed discussion – indeed one of the most 
detailed in the secondary literature – of this “fraudulent” contract, 
which “has no basis in ‘nature,’” but “is a result of a particular 
form of social development”: “It is a contract that gives ‘all to one 
side’ and is based on inequality; its function is to maintain and 
foster that inequality by legitimizing political regulation by the 
liberal state” (148, 150). Her later “sexual contract” can be seen 
as extrapolating this demystificatory contract to the analysis of 
gender relations, though as I said she does not explicitly connect 
them herself in the later book. At any rate, I want to suggest that we 
formally recognize this use of social contract theory as a strategy 
for theorizing domination within a contract framework, since, as I 
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will argue below, it provides a conceptual entry point for importing 
the concerns and aims of radical democratic political theory into 
a mainstream apparatus. And because the formal act of naming 
an entity helps to make it more real for us, incorporating it into 
our discursive universe, I move, as proposed (Mills 2000), that 
we call it the “domination contract.”
Finally, the third factor accounting for ambiguities in Pateman’s 
position is terminological. “Contractarianism” is usually taken in 
political theory to be coextensive with social contract theory in 
general, and as such to be a very broad umbrella covering many 
different variants (as illustrated above). In particular, as both Will 
Kymlicka (1991) and Jean Hampton (2001; 2007) point out in essays 
on the subject, the Hobbesian variety of contract theory, which 
derives morality from prudence as a conventionalist set of rules for 
coordinating the constrained advancing of our interests in a social 
framework, is radically different in its crucial assumptions from 
the Kantian variety, for which the contract is merely a regulative 
ideal, and morality inheres in the objective categorical imperative 
to respect others’ personhood. The former kind leads to David 
Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (1986), the latter to John Rawls’s 
A Theory of Justice (1971), two books obviously quite different in 
their prescriptions for social justice despite their common contract 
identity. For this reason, some ethicists and political philosophers, 
such as T. M. Scanlon and Stephen Darwall, think the distinction 
is so crucial that it needs to be made explicit in our terminology, 
and they differentiate accordingly between contractarianism (the 
Hobbesian use of the contract idea) and contractualism (the Kantian 
use of the contract idea) (Darwall 2003). In this vocabulary, Gauthier 
would be a contractarian, but Rawls would then be a contractualist. 
Now Pateman in the opening pages of The Sexual Contract 
(1988) speaks generally about “contract theory.” But it turns out 
that she is using the term in a restricted sense, for she specifies that 
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“property” is crucial to her argument, though this is not “property 
in the sense in which ‘property’ commonly enters into discussions 
of contract theory,” as including material goods and civil freedom. 
Rather, “The subject of all the contracts with which I am concerned 
is a very special kind of property, the property that individuals are 
held to own in their persons” (5). And she goes on to say:
I shall refer to the [most radical form of contract doctrine], 
which has its classical expression in Hobbes’ theory, as 
contractarian theory or contractarianism (in the United States 
it is usually called libertarianism…) … For contemporary 
contractarians… social life and relationships not only 
originate from a social contract but, properly, are seen as an 
endless series of discrete contracts… From the standpoint 
of contract, in social life there are contracts all the way 
down. (14-15)
When Pateman uses the term contractarianism, then, 
it is really this restricted version of contract she has in mind 
(Hobbesian/libertarian), involving contracts “all the way down,” 
not social contract theory in general. And obviously this would 
not be an accurate characterization of Kantian contract theory, for 
which the will is to be determined not by subjective inclination “all 
the way down” but rather objective universal moral law. For Kant, 
the normative bedrock of societal interaction is supposed to be the 
categorical imperative to respect others as ends in themselves. 
So when Pateman writes that in contract theory “universal 
freedom” is always “a political fiction,” since “contract always 
generates political right in the form of relations of domination 
and subordination” (8), one has to remember that her implicit 
reference is primarily to contract in the specific term-of-art sense 
she has previously stipulated. But given what various theorists 
have seen as the crucial differences between the two kinds, the 
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extrapolation of her indictment to the Kantian version does not, to 
say the least, follow straightforwardly. I am going to proceed, then, 
on the assumption that the very strong statement made in the jacket 
copy on the paperback edition of The Sexual Contract – “One of 
the main targets of the book is those who try to turn contractarian 
theory to progressive use, and a major thesis of the book is that 
this is not possible” – is mistaken as a general characterization 
of contract theory, and try to demonstrate precisely the opposite: 
that social contract theory, including Pateman’s sexual contract, 
can be so turned. 
2  HAMPTON, PATEMAN, OKIN: TOWARD A 
THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
So what I now want to do is to argue for a version of the 
sexual contract which does not preclude using contract theory 
to address issues of gender justice, and which can be seen as a 
particular instantiation of the domination contract. Since two of 
the most prominent feminist advocates of social contract theory 
were the late Jean Hampton and the late Susan Moller Okin, I will 
try to show that, suitably modified, Pateman’s sexual contract is 
not at all in necessary theoretical opposition to their views, as is 
conventionally supposed. In fact I will claim that it can be thought 
of as complementing them, and should indeed be synthesized with 
them to produce a distinctively feminist contract theory that is 
all the more powerful precisely for its recognition of the historic 
(and ongoing) patriarchal restriction of the terms of the contract. 
Consider first Jean Hampton. In her essays on contract, 
Hampton (1990; 2001; 2007) makes a crucial point that will be 
useful for us in developing the idea of the domination contract. 
She reminds us that unlike the contemporary Rawlsian contract, 
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which is merely a normative thought-experiment, at least some 
of the classic contract theorists (though not Kant) “intended 
simultaneously to describe the nature of political societies, and 
to prescribe a new and more defensible form for such societies” 
(Hampton 2007, 481). So for them the contract was both 
descriptive and prescriptive. Moreover, Hampton believes that – 
suitably attenuated – this descriptive side of the contract should be 
revived. For once we realize that contract is basically a matter of 
“imagery,” a “picture,” we should recognize that it is not vulnerable 
to standard literalist objections (for example, that no promises are 
actually exchanged to support governmental structures), as it is 
essentially just expressing the insight that “authoritative political 
societies are human creations,” “conventionally-generated” (478, 
481-82). 
So the first great virtue of contract theory for Hampton is 
its capturing of the crucial factual/descriptive truth that society 
and the polity are human-made – not organic “natural” growths 
or the product of divine creation. And this insight is, of course, 
distinctively modern, demarcating the conceptual universe of the 
modern period from that of antiquity and medievalism. Thus we 
get Hobbes’s (1996, 9) famous anti-Aristotelian characterization 
of the commonwealth as “an Artificiall Man; though of greater 
stature and strength than the Naturall.” The polis is not natural but 
constructed, artificial. Similarly, contemporary commentators such 
as Michael Walzer (1995, 164) suggest that: “Perhaps the most 
significant claim of social contract theory is that political society is 
a human construct . . . and not an organic growth.” Banal as it may 
seem to us now, this insight was revolutionary in its own time, and 
I will argue below that indeed its full revolutionary significance has 
yet to be fully appreciated and exploited. For once we understand 
how far the “construction” extends, we will recognize that it can 
be shown to apply to gender and race also.
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The second important truth captured by contract theory is, 
of course, the one that the contemporary contract does focus on: 
the moral equality of the contracting parties and its normative 
implications for socio-political structures. Here Hobbes is not the 
appropriate representative figure since, as noted above (Kymlicka 
1991; Hampton 2001; Hampton 2007; Darwall 2003), commentators 
standardly differentiate between the Hobbesian and the Kantian 
contract. The first is rooted in the rough physical and mental (rather 
than moral) equality of the contractors in the state of nature, and 
leads to rational prudence rather than the altruistic regard for others 
for their own sake, as beings of intrinsic moral worth, that we 
associate with the second, that of Kant. Thus in the most famous 
contemporary version of the moral contract, John Rawls’s (1971, 
11) thought-experiment to determine what “the principles that free 
and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would 
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental 
terms of their association,” this scenario is not set up to be a process 
of bargaining, but rather, through the veil of ignorance, the modeling 
of an impartial other-regardingness. 
Now it should be obvious that in this weak and minimal sense 
– contract as committed to society’s being a human construct created 
by morally equal contractors, whose interests should be given equal 
weight in the socio-political institutions thereby established – there is 
nothing that anybody, including those wishing to theorize gender and 
racial subordination, should find objectionable about contract theory. 
Certainly it is not the case that feminists and critical race theorists 
want to argue, on the contrary, that socio-political institutions are 
natural rather than humanly created or that some humans are morally 
superior to others. At this highly abstract level of characterization, 
social contract theory is unexceptionable. 
The problem really inheres, I suggest, in the assumptions 
that begin to be incorporated, the conceptual infra-structure that 
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begins to be installed, at a lower level of abstraction, and the ways 
in which, whether explicitly or tacitly, they vitiate the accuracy 
of the descriptive mapping, obfuscate crucial social realities, 
embed certain tendentious conceptual partitionings (e.g., the way 
the private/public distinction is drawn), and thereby undercut the 
transformative normative egalitarian potential of the apparatus. So 
my claim is that our critical attention should really be directed at 
these “thicker” auxiliary shaping assumptions rather than the “thin” 
idea of the contract itself (in the minimal sense sketched above). 
Start with the factual/descriptive side. While it is true that 
society and the state are human creations, it is obviously false, 
as mainstream contract theory classically implies, that all (adult) 
humans are equal contractors, have equal causal input into this 
process of creation, and freely give informed consent to the 
structures and institutions thereby established. The repudiation of 
this picture was, of course, the whole point of Rousseau’s critique 
in his depiction of the “class contract.” The wealthy have more 
power than the poor, and manipulate the rest of the population into 
accepting socio-political arrangements to which they would not 
actually consent were they aware of their real consequences. So 
the human equality of the state of nature becomes the unnatural 
“political” inequality of a class society ruled by the rich. But this 
plutocratic polity is not to be thought of as the outcome of free 
and informed choice among symmetrically positioned individuals. 
Rather it is the outcome of the collusion amongst themselves of a 
social group with far greater influence, who have their own self-
seeking agenda. The real “contractors” (in the sense of those who 
are controlling things and know what is going on) are the rich. 
Similarly, in Pateman’s sexual contract and my racial contract, men 
and whites, through a mixture of force and ideology, subordinate 
women and people of color under the banner of a supposedly 
consensual contract. So the latter are the victims, the objects, of the 
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resulting “contract” rather than subjects, freely contracting parties, 
and are oppressed by the resulting socio-political institutions. 
But note that there is no inconsistency at all between pointing 
out these usually unacknowledged facts of class, gender, and 
racial subordination and continuing to affirm the “weak” (arguably 
defining) contractual assertion of a humanly-created society and 
polity. Contract theory in this minimal sense is not refuted by the 
actual history of social oppression and political exclusion since it 
is still true that it is humans (though a particular subset) who have 
been responsible for this history. The problem is that the actual 
“contracts” and their agents have been quite different from how 
they have been represented in the mainstream literature. But far 
from the subordinated being motivated as a result to want to deny 
the role of human agency in creating the resulting polity, surely this 
is all the more reason for them to want to affirm, indeed insist upon 
it! Class society, patriarchy, and white supremacy come into being 
not “naturally” but as the result of collective human causality – in 
which, however, some humans have a far greater causal role than 
others, and subsequently benefit far more from the socio-political 
and economic institutions thereby established. The social contract 
in its guise as the domination contract captures these crucial 
“descriptive” realities while simultaneously, by emphasizing their 
“artificial” genesis, bringing them across the conceptual border from 
the realm of the natural into the realm of the political. Class society, 
patriarchy, and white supremacy are themselves “unnatural,” and 
are just as “political” and oppressive as the (formally and overtly 
political) white male absolutist rule (for example, as advocated 
by Sir Robert Filmer), predicated on white male hierarchy and 
moral inequality, that is the exclusive target of mainstream contract 
theorists, and which the contract apparatus prescribes abolishing.
Consider now the normative/prescriptive side. The problem 
is obviously not that moral egalitarianism among humans is an 
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unattractive moral ideal, but rather that in these actual contracts 
moral egalitarianism was never realized. Pateman (1988) and 
numerous other feminist theorists over the past three decades 
(Clark and Lange 1979; Okin 1992; Pateman and Gross 1997) have 
documented the ways in which women have been seen as unequal 
by virtually all the male theorists of the classic canon, including 
(with the qualified and ambiguous exception of Hobbes) the very 
contract theorists who, as paradigmatic theorists of modernity, so 
loudly proclaimed human equality as their foundational assumption. 
Moreover, this inequality has been manifest in their drawing of 
the public/private distinction, their conceptions of marriage, and 
their view of the appropriate place of women in the socio-political 
institutions supposedly “contractually” established. Though the 
literature on race is less extensive, a comparable body of work is 
now emerging here also (Goldberg [1993; 2002]; Outlaw [1996]; 
Mills [1997; 1998]; Mehta [1999]; Pitts [2005]; Valls [2005]; 
Sala-Molins [2006]; Losurdo [2011]; Hobson [2012]). It argues 
similarly that people of color have generally been excluded from 
equal status in liberal thought, and have been seen (in my phrase) 
as “sub-persons” rather than full persons, thereby justifying their 
subordination in the various racialized socio-political structures 
– Native American and Australian expropriation, African slavery, 
Third World colonization – imposed on non-Europeans by Europe 
in the modern epoch. 
But obviously neither feminists nor critical race theorists 
are seeking to reject moral egalitarianism as such. Rather their 
complaint is that this egalitarianism has been denied to women 
and nonwhites both in theory and in practice, and that – at least 
for those of us still sympathetic to contract theory – a genuinely 
inclusive “contract” would need to recognize this legacy and 
prescribe appropriate corrective and transformational measures 
in the light of its historic injustice.
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The real source of the problem should now have emerged 
clearly. The mainstream story of the contract builds on top of, or 
conflates with, the eminently reasonable minimal assumptions 
of human socio-political agency and human egalitarianism an 
additional set of assumptions that are quite false, radically untrue 
to the historical record. Only some humans had effective causal 
input; only some humans had their moral equality recognized. In 
this fashion, it completely mystifies the creation (in the ongoing 
rather than ab initio sense) of society, denying or obfuscating the 
various structures of domination that are either transformed (class, 
gender), or that come into existence (race), in the modern period. 
Thus when Christopher Morris (1999a, x), in his introduction 
to his social contract anthology, writes: “There may, however, 
be some explanatory import to the idea of states of nature and 
social contracts that should not be overlooked. . . . our political 
institutions and arrangements are, in some sense, our creations,” 
the obvious and classic retort is: Just who are this “we”? (“What 
do you mean we, white man?”) Did women create patriarchy? 
Did nonwhites create white supremacy? Obviously not – these 
“political institutions and arrangements” were created by some 
humans, not all. By its undifferentiated descriptive individualism, 
by its failure to advert to the existence of, and need to eliminate, 
“political institutions and arrangements” of group domination, the 
mainstream version of the contract sabotages the radical potential 
of the apparatus. 
And it is here, I would suggest, that Hampton’s contract 
theory becomes deficient and needs supplementation. Normatively, 
Hampton (2001) endorses a feminist Kantian contractualism based 
on the intrinsic worth of all persons (as part, though not all, of 
a comprehensive ethic). Moreover, as noted at the start, she also 
argues for the revival of the descriptive dimension of contract 
theory. This proposal is in keeping with her emphasis elsewhere, 
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for example in her book on political philosophy (Hampton 1997, 
xiii-xv), that the subject should not be thought of as purely 
normative, but as extending to factual issues as well. The political 
philosopher, Hampton argues, should seek to understand the 
“political and social ‘deep structure’ which generates not only 
forms of interaction that make certain kinds of distributions [of 
resources] inevitable but also moral theories that justify those 
distributions.” But she never brings these insights together, in the 
sense of asking how the revived descriptive contract she advocates 
would need to be rethought in the light of sexist exclusions, or how 
the descriptive and the normative sides of the contract would now 
need to be related given patriarchy as a “deep structure” with such 
a fundamental shaping influence on society (including, reflexively, 
the very moral theories generated about its founding). Instead, 
like Morris, she speaks of “political societies as conventionally 
generated human creations” (Hampton 2007, 482) and, without 
asking who these “humans” and these “people” are, glosses the 
contract claim as equivalent to the assertion that:
Certain institutions, practices and rules become conven-
tionally entrenched (in a variety of ways) in a social 
system, and insofar as the people continue to support them, 
these conventions continue to prevail, and thus comprise 
the political and legal system in the country. (481)
Despite her feminism, then, Hampton does not press the 
further question of how we should think of this supposedly 
contract-equivalent “support” once the gender subordination 
of half the population is taken into account. Pateman’s sexual 
contract fills this theoretical gap, making clear that a “contract” 
of gender domination would more accurately illuminate than the 
mainstream version not merely the “deep structure” of a society 
based on patriarchy, but also its justificatory moral theories and 
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how they become “conventionally entrenched.” We would then 
be better positioned theoretically not merely to apply, in a gender-
inclusive way, the Kantian contractual theory Hampton endorses, 
but to understand, on the meta-theoretical level, why its previous 
(male) application has been so systematically and structurally, not 
just contingently, exclusionary. For we would then be in a position 
to recognize gender itself as a political system established by the 
contract, and prescribing accordingly its own ground rules about 
the cartography of the social and the appropriate distribution of 
rights, privileges, and freedoms in the polity.2 
The relation between the normative and descriptive aspects 
of the contract is thus necessarily more complicated in this 
revisionist contractualism than it is in mainstream contract theory. 
In the mainstream contract, a (supposedly) consensual founding 
establishes an egalitarian moral code. So this is a code we can 
(supposedly) be comfortable in endorsing. But once the contract 
is unmasked as really a contract of domination, the code itself 
needs to become an object of scrutiny for us. Under cover of 
egalitarianism, the domination contract generates norms, and 
stipulations about how to apply these norms, that will themselves 
2 By contrast, Hampton’s (2001, 352) apparent naivety about Kant is well 
illustrated when she writes at one point: “Kant also has opponents who, while 
agreeing that our value is noninstrumental and objective, reject the idea that 
all humans are of equal value – for example, those who think human beings 
of a certain gender or race or caste are higher in value (and so deserving of 
better treatment) than those of a different gender, race, or caste.” But of course 
Kant himself was a sexist and racist, for whom women could only be “passive 
citizens,” while blacks and Native Americans were “natural slaves.” (See: 
Schröder [1997]; Eze [1997a]; Bernasconi [2001b; 2002; 2011]; Mills [2005b]; 
Kleingeld [2007].) The concepts of the sexual and racial contracts enable us to 
understand how these seemingly contradictory commitments are reconcilable, 
not merely in Kant but most other Enlightenment thinkers of the period, through 
the workings of white male moral psychologies and moral boundaries created 
by the exclusionary “particularistic universalism” of the domination contract. 
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reinforce domination, and so which need to be interrogated 
by those seeking to end their subordination by the contract. A 
greater degree of reflexivity, of self-conscious meta-theoretical 
distancing from and questioning of concepts and values, is 
therefore required, insofar as the new normative contract has to 
take account of realities ignored or misdescribed by the terms 
of the old normative contract – certainly in its original form, 
but also later, even when nominally updated and purged of its 
original sexism and racism. 
For even when the contemporary contract seems to drop 
the descriptive dimension, as in Rawls’s thought-experiment, 
it continues tacitly to manifest itself, if only by default, in an 
underlying factual picture, a version of history, and a set of 
assumptions about society that continue to reproduce the inequities 
and obfuscations of the historic contract, and, correspondingly, an 
apparatus that retains many of its deficiencies. The famous early 
feminist critique of Rawls, of course, was that knowledge of gender 
was not one of the things listed as being stripped from us behind 
the veil. Nor was there any awareness, in the “general” social and 
historical facts we take with us there, of the historic subordination 
of half the human race – surely “general” enough to have made 
the cut! By assuming heads of households as the representative 
contractors, by taking the family as ideal, by not challenging the 
role of the public/private distinction, Rawls naturalized the family 
in the same way the classic contract theorists did. 
Consider now the reclamatory work of Susan Moller Okin 
(1989). Okin’s insight was to recognize that Rawls’s moral contract 
apparatus had the potential to go beyond Rawls’s own conclusions, 
once we admit a “veiled” knowledge of crucial non-ideal facts 
on gender: 
There is strikingly little indication, throughout most of A 
Theory of Justice, that the modern liberal society to which 
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the principles of justice are to be applied is deeply and 
pervasively gender-structured. Thus an ambiguity runs 
throughout the work … On the one hand, as I shall argue, a 
consistent and wholehearted application of Rawls’s liberal 
principles of justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally 
the gender system of our society. On the other hand, in his 
own account of his theory, this challenge is barely hinted at, 
much less developed … [This] potential critique of gender-
structured social institutions … can be developed by taking 
seriously the fact that those formulating the principles of 
justice do not know their sex [behind the veil]. (89, 105) 
Okin thus seeks to appropriate the contract for feminism, and 
in the closing chapters of her book shows how such a critique of a 
gender-structured social order can be developed from behind the 
veil. Correspondingly, in her review essay (1990) on The Sexual 
Contract, she criticizes Pateman for rejecting in principle (as Okin 
sees it) the attempt “to employ contractual thinking in the service of 
feminism” (659). But I would claim that there need be no principled 
opposition at all between their two approaches once we conceive 
of them as engaged in different tasks, with Pateman’s view of the 
contract as intrinsically subordinating paradigmatically meant as a 
characterization of the Hobbesian/proprietarian contract in particular. 
Okin’s skepticism about the sexual contract idea – she writes at one 
point “it is not clear to me what we gain in understanding by tracing 
[the forms of patriarchal power] to a supposed contract made by 
men” (660) – misses the value of a theoretical innovation that can 
provide the very knowledge behind the veil that Rawls’s idealized 
contract avoids. The gender-structured social institutions Okin cites 
are precisely what are summarized in Pateman’s non-ideal contract: 
the sexual contract. 
So we can, I suggest, bring them together under a division of 
conceptual labor in a common enterprise: Pateman doing the actual 
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non-ideal contract, Okin doing the corrective normative contract. 
As emphasized, the relation between the descriptive and normative 
sides of the contract becomes radically different in this alternative 
contract theory since the real-life contract is being conceptualized 
as a domination contract. Thus our aim becomes to dismantle rather 
than endorse it. As a “contractor” in the original position, one is 
now making a prudential choice informed by the possibility of 
ending up female in a society structured by the sexual contract. 
Gender subordination in its manifold dimensions and implications 
can thus become the object of normative critique, since these 
“general facts” are not ignored as in the mainstream contract. The 
full ramifications of patriarchy not just for the family but society 
in general (the state, the legal system, the differential status of 
men and women), as well as typical male moral psychology and 
dominant androcentric ideology, can all now legitimately be 
considered within a “contractual” framework. 
In this fashion, I claim, we can synthesize the crucial 
insights of Hampton, Pateman, and Okin to produce a feminist 
contractualism stronger than any of them individually: 
Hampton’s moral Kantian contractualism, informed behind the 
veil by Pateman’s factual Rousseauean contract, combined so as 
to generate an expanded variant of Okin’s non-ideal version of 
Rawlsian contractualism, all deployed to achieve gender justice. 
From Hampton, the idea of contract as a descriptive metaphor 
capturing the key insight of society as a human creation, and 
the normative endorsement of Kantian contractualism. From 
Pateman, the idea that the actual contract is an exclusionary 
sexual contract, not a gender-inclusive one, based on female 
inequality and inferiority, thereby shaping both society and, 
reflexively, our ideas about society. From Okin, the idea that a 
feminist agenda on justice can nonetheless still be promoted in 
a contractual framework by imagining oneself behind Rawls’s 
veil with knowledge of these non-ideal gender realities. So if in 
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the mainstream contract, the circumstances of the creation of 
the socio-political sphere imply the moral endorsement of the 
institutions thereby created, in the radical use of the domination 
contract, this is inverted. The characterization of the descriptive 
contract here serves to alert us to the realities of systemic 
institutional oppression, which need to be dismantled.
 
3  THE DOMINATION CONTRACT
Let me now turn in greater detail to the illustration of the contrast 
between these two contracts, and the ways I think progressives can 
use the domination contract to address issues of gender justice, and 
social justice more generally. Consider the following table, which 
summarizes what I see as the crucial differences:
MAINSTREAM CONTRACT DOMINATION CONTRACT
ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Ideal theory Non-ideal theory
STARTING-POINT
Ground zero (state of nature, original 
position) Unjust stage of society
ROLE OF HISTORY
None presupposed Historical account presupposed
BASIC AGENTS
People as pre-social atomic individuals People as members of social groups in relations of domination and subordination
STATUS NORM IN SOCIETY
Equality (ostensibly) Inequality (explicitly)
ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS
Typically mutually beneficial Typically exploitative
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JURIDICO-POLITICAL SPHERE
Egalitarian Biased toward dominant groups
HUMAN DIVISIONS
Class, race, and gender as natural Class, race, and gender as artificial
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
Basically imported from nature Fundamentally transformed by society (amour de soi à amour-propre)
OBSTACLES TO ACCURATE SOCIAL COGNITION
Individual bias, “passions,” “inclination,” 
short-term self-interest Group interests, dominant-group ideation
LOCUS OF PROBLEMS
Human nature Corrupting social institutions
GOAL OF CONTRACT
To create a just society (laws, govt., etc.) To reinforce and codify unjust institutions
HEURISTIC PURPOSE FOR US
Readers’ endorsement of the contract as 
creating an ideally just society
Readers’ condemnation of the contract, and 
corresponding awakening to syste-matic 
social injustice and the need for appropriate 
corrective measures to realize a just society
The key points are as follows:
First, the overarching framework is non-ideal theory.3 In the 
historic version of the mainstream contract, conceived of (though 
falsely) as consensual and inclusive, the way in which the polity 
is founded is supposed to confer on it a positive normative status. 
3 I am using the ideal theory/non-ideal theory distinction in the sense demarcated 
by Rawls. Both ideal and non-ideal theory involve the utilization of moral ideals, 
and the attempt to determine what justice requires in a particular situation, so 
the contrast is not that between moral and amoral approaches. The distinction is 
rather that ideal theory aims at mapping a perfectly just society, while non-ideal 
theory seeks to adjudicate what corrective or rectificatory justice would require 
in societies that are unjust. Rawls’s focus is almost exclusively on the former. 
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As such, the mainstream contract assumes ideal circumstances: 
society and government are brought into existence in a way that is 
fair, respecting the rights of those involved. By contrast, we know 
perfectly well from history that oppression of one kind or another 
has been the social norm since humanity left the hunting-and-
gathering stage. The domination contract begins from this simple 
reality. Though the contemporary Rawlsian contract drops any 
historical claims, it nonetheless inherits this orientation in that Rawls 
sets out to ask what principles people would choose in ideally just 
circumstances. Thus he makes clear throughout the book that his 
contract is an exercise in ideal theory, intended to work out “the 
principles of justice... defining a perfectly just society, given favorable 
conditions,” and presuming “strict compliance” (1971, 351). 
However, he claims that this starting-point is ultimately intended to 
illuminate the non-ideal: “If ideal theory is worthy of study, it must 
be because, as I have conjectured, it is the fundamental part of the 
theory of justice and essential for the nonideal part as well” (391). 
But a case can be made that such a starting-point handicaps 
his enterprise, and certainly the manifest failure in his own work, 
and in the thousands of articles it has inspired over the last forty 
years, to apply his theory to the “nonideal” realities of gender and 
race does not encourage confidence in it. By definition, problems 
arise in non-ideal theory that do not arise in ideal theory, and one 
will need mapping concepts and data sets which are not readily 
extrapolatable from those of ideal theory. So it raises the question 
of how useful, let alone “essential,” it actually is. The mainstream 
contract – unsurprisingly given its conceptual ancestry – tends to 
abstract away from issues of social subordination, since historically 
it is really predicated on the experience of the bourgeois white 
male subject, that sub-section of the population emancipated by 
modernity. By contrast, the revisionist contract, through utilizing 
the device of the domination contract, makes such issues its primary 
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focus, since (following Rousseau) it starts not from the state of 
nature but from an already-existing unjust society, and then asks 
what measures of justice would be necessary to correct for them. 
Rawlsian “ideal theory”’s ability to deal with the “non-
ideal” must therefore be challenged (Mills 2005a). As just pointed 
out, to the extent that Rawls’s method has been found useful in 
theorizing gender justice, most notably in Okin’s (1989) work, it 
has been precisely through the repudiation of the key Rawlsian 
assumption of the ideal nature of the family, as a supposed 
paradigm of human interaction to be sharply contrasted with 
the interaction of strangers, and thus not requiring justice to 
regulate it. The disadvantaging of female children and women 
is only able to appear on the conceptual radar screen through the 
rethinking of the public/private boundary, and the unsentimental 
scrutiny of the actual, real-life family. In the case of racial justice, 
the non-ideal looms even more definitively, since measures of 
compensatory justice (affirmative action, reparations) presume 
by definition the need to correct for a history of injustice that 
Rawls’s ideal-theory focus sidesteps. It is noteworthy that while 
in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Freeman 2003), there 
is at least a chapter by Martha Nussbaum (2003) on Rawls and 
feminism, there is no comparable chapter – indeed no section in 
any chapter – on race. And apart from the fact that the whiteness 
of the profession is even more overwhelming than its maleness, 
apart from the fact that most white political theorists, whether 
political scientists or political philosophers, take for granted what 
Rogers Smith (1997) describes as the misleading “anomaly” 
view of American racism, the role of the ideal-theory framework 
itself must surely be a major contributory factor to this pattern 
of systematic omission and evasion. What has supposedly been 
intended to facilitate discussion of the remediation of injustice 
has served instead to obstruct it. 
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Relatedly, the domination contract is necessarily historical. 
Though contemporary poststructuralism is something of an 
exception, radical political theory, whether of class, gender, or 
race, traditionally emphasizes the importance of investigating the 
real history that has brought us to this point, and that explains who 
the major political players are and what are their agendas. Thus it 
seeks to contest both mystified histories and ahistorical naturalized 
accounts that deny any history, which simply sever the present from 
the past. Marx (to cite a very unfashionable figure) was famous for 
excoriating liberals and those he dubbed the “vulgar” economists for 
their timeless and decontextualized portrayal of the “free exchange” 
between capitalist and worker, without attention to the sequence 
of events (for example, the enclosures in Britain) that had reduced 
people who had previously been able to make a living from the 
land to workers with only their labor-power to sell. In the radical 
use of contract he pioneers, Rousseau establishes the precedent 
by giving an alternative narrative – naïve by our standards, but 
expressing underlying truths nonetheless – of the origins of class 
inequality. Similarly, Pateman offers in her book (Pateman 1988) an 
“as if” account of the origins of patriarchy, while I – comparatively 
advantaged by the fact that European expansionism takes place in 
the modern period, accompanied by a massive paper trail – was able 
to draw on actual events in describing how global white supremacy 
was established (Mills 1997). But in all three cases, the crucial point 
is that the non-ideal structure of domination in question, whether of 
class, gender, or race, is not “natural,” not the outcome of the state of 
nature, but a socio-historical product. The greater realism of radical 
contract theory as against mainstream contract theory is manifested 
in its recognition that the “contract” is really (à la Hampton) a way 
of talking about the human creation of socio-political institutions 
as the result of previous socio-historical processes, not ex nihilo 
from the state of nature.
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And this history is, of course, one of group domination 
and subordination rather than the classically individualist social 
ontology, and transactions among equal individuals, of the 
mainstream contract. I do not at all mean by this to endorse a 
communitarian position of the Sandelian variety (Sandel 1998), 
since, in agreement with many critics, I believe, contra Sandel, that 
people can and should gain a cognitive and normative distance from 
their socially-assigned identities. My point rather is Rousseau’s, 
and later Marx’s, classic claim – now a political axiom among 
progressives – that society is most illuminatingly seen as a system 
of group domination rather than as a collection of individuals. So 
it is as members of social groups that individuals originally come 
to consciousness and agency, even if they later react against their 
socialization, and their differential status within the “contract” 
is tied to their group membership. The general facts of history 
and society that people take behind Rawls’s veil apparently do 
not include the subordination of women or the subordination of 
nonwhites. (There is, of course, some sensitivity to class issues.) 
But we are certainly not bound by Rawls’s ignorance. What 
makes radical contract theory better suited to make use of the 
device of the veil is its demystified, non-idealized view of the 
human history of the past few thousand years as largely a history 
of social oppression, so that groups in interlocking patterns of 
domination constitute the real social ontology (Cudd 2006). The 
class, sexual, and racial contracts each capture particular aspects of 
social domination (while missing others), so that, whether singly 
or (ideally) in combination, they register the obvious fact that 
society is shaped by the powerful acting together, not individuals 
acting singly. 
As such, the domination contract, which makes groups the 
key players, is obviously truer to the actual history of the world. If, 
as argued at the start, contract in the minimal sense does not specify 
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who the crucial human actors are that create the socio-political 
world, then a group-based contract theory is not a contradiction in 
terms, and should be embraced by us as a more useful philosophical 
concept for political theory. The descriptive side of the contract 
is more accurately represented in the domination contract, and is 
certainly vastly more illuminating as a conceptual framework for 
orienting the prescriptive contract, since it points us toward the 
really important moral issues, viz. how do we dismantle these 
structures so as to achieve genuine egalitarianism. With such 
knowledge behind the veil, Rawlsian contractors would not be 
able to ignore gender and racial subordination as they currently do.
As a corollary, in understanding human motivation, one needs 
to take account of people’s group membership, and how, whether 
privileged or subordinated, it shapes their psychology. Rousseau’s 
(1997a) famous critique of his social contract predecessors was 
that “They spoke of Savage Man and depicted Civil man” (132). A 
healthy amour de soi had been socially corrupted into an unhealthy 
amour propre, which contractarians like Hobbes, not recognizing 
its social genesis, then took to be part of the human condition as 
such. Similarly, in Marx’s critique of a specifically bourgeois 
vision of homo economicus, in feminist theorists’ work on the 
production of “male” and “female” traits by gendered parental 
upbringing, in critical race theorists’ analyses of “whiteness” and 
its psychological influence on its possessors, the conceptual door 
is opened to a much richer set of resources for theorizing actual 
human motivation and its social shaping than in the impoverished 
psychological framework of mainstream contract theory. 
The relation between equality as a value and the contract 
also needs to be rethought. The mainstream contract is, of course, 
famous for its nominal egalitarianism, its emphasis that in the 
state of nature all men are equal, whether in physical and mental 
abilities, as in Hobbes, or in moral status, as in Locke and Kant. 
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Hence the deep connection between social contract theory and 
conventional narratives of modernity, the promise of the American 
and French Revolutions. And this equality is then supposed to 
translate itself (in the societies created by these equal men) into 
a juridico-political equality, equality before the law and equality 
of citizenship, and in economic (and other) transactions that are 
non-exploitative in nature. 
But however attractive this may be as an ideal, it obviously 
bears no correspondence with real life for the majority of the 
population, even in the modern period. Rousseau’s concern is 
that the artificial class inequalities of society undermine this 
moral equality, and in Marx’s more sophisticated treatment, this 
is elaborated into the point that formal equality at the level of 
the relations of exchange is substantively undercut by economic 
compulsion at the level of the relations of production. But for 
gender and race, the situation is even worse. As feminists have long 
documented, in the case of gender, the “equality” was originally 
not even nominal, let alone substantive, since with the qualified 
exception of Hobbes, all the major contract theorists saw women 
as inferior to men, and so as appropriately to be regulated by male 
authority. Moreover, this theoretical inferiority was, of course, also 
manifest practically, in real life, in legal and political institutions. 
So the value that is perhaps most intimately associated with the 
social contract tradition – equality – was not at all meant to be 
extended to half the human race. Likewise, as various theorists 
of race and imperialism have pointed out, once one examines the 
representations (“savages,” “barbarians”) and the experiences 
of people of color in the modern period – expropriated and 
exterminated Native Americans and Australians, enslaved and 
later Jim-Crowed blacks, colonized non-Europeans – it becomes 
clear that both in theory and in practice, only white men were 
equal. Not merely as a matter of fact, but as a matter of proclaimed 
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moral and legal norms, nonwhites had an inferior to non-existent 
schedule of rights – and were thus non- or at best second-class 
citizens. How, then, can it make sense to conceptualize society as 
if, in the modern period, equality becomes the generally accepted 
norm, when in fact such a small section of the population were 
actually seen as equal? 
In the domination contract, by contrast, this reality is 
frankly faced: inequality is the actual social norm obtaining for 
the majority. The evasive conceptual assimilation of the status 
of white women and nonwhites to the status of white men that 
is embedded in the mainstream contract, thereby burying the 
distinctive problems the former groups face, is thus precluded. 
Correspondingly, the radical contract recognizes that the crucial 
juridico-political institutions are not egalitarian in their functioning 
either, but biased in various ways by class, gender, and racial 
privilege. The huge body of literature standardly ignored by 
contract theorists – the original left analyses of the workings of the 
state in capitalist society, the more recent work on the gendered 
and racial state (MacKinnon 1989; Anthony Marx 1998; Goldberg 
2002), as well as all the biases in the legal system – can then 
legitimately enter here, rather than being conceptually blocked 
by the otherworldly and completely fanciful pictures of a neutral 
juridico-political realm assumed by the mainstream contract. And 
far from fair and reciprocal advantage being the norm – Rawls 
suggests, absurdly, that we think of society as actually (not just 
ideally) being “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” 
(1971, 4) – exploitation of various kinds – of class, gender, and 
race – is the norm (Sample 2003). Accordingly, one of the main 
aims of the normative contract will be the elimination of these 
structures of exploitation – unequal chances for the poor and 
working class, sexual exploitation, differential white advantage 
and corresponding wealth (Shipler 2004; Barry 1984; Oliver and 
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Shapiro 2006) – that the individualist perspective of mainstream 
contract theory tends to obfuscate.4 
In addition, the group interests of the privileged, and their 
resulting desire to maintain their privilege, will become both an 
ideational obstacle to achieving social transparency and a material 
obstacle to progressive change, which will need to be taken into 
account in theorizing the dynamics of social cognition and the 
possibilities for social transformation. For both the mainstream 
contract and the revisionist contract, accurate factual and moral 
cognition is crucial. But for the mainstream contract, the obstacles 
to attaining this desired objectivity are generally conceptualized 
in individualistic terms. For the domination contract, on the other 
hand, there is an additional category of cognitive obstacles that 
are generated by the vested interests in the established order of the 
dominant group, and their differential power over social ideation. So 
that whole set of problems that in the Marxist tradition is associated 
with the subject of ideology can enter here. If for mainstream contract 
theory social transparency is the ideal, here social opacity is the 
norm, and hegemonic conceptual and normative frameworks will 
have been shaped by the fact of group domination. So again, one 
will be equipped with a far more sophisticated and realistic view of 
the workings of the polity and its dominant illusory self-conceptions 
than in the mainstream contract. One will be beginning from the 
elementary political fact – and how could this be ignored by any 
serious political theory? – that dominant groups will in general want 
to preserve their hegemony, so that it is by no means just a matter of 
coming up with a more convincing picture of a just society.  
4 Rawls’s left-liberal, social democratic contract is, of course, good on class – 
that is its main strength, from a radical point of view – though even here some 
on the political left argued that it did not go far enough, and was unrealistic or 
evasive about the implications for political power and people’s social status of 
the economic inequalities it left intact. See, for example, Peffer (1990). 
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Finally, apart from (I would claim anyway) all of these obvious 
merits, the domination contract has the great and overwhelming 
virtue of conceptualizing class, gender, and race as themselves 
artificial, not natural as in the mainstream contract. So it is not 
merely that society is seen as a complex of groups in dominance 
and subordination, but that the formation of the groups themselves 
is a product of the contract(s). The familiar claim of recent radical 
democratic theory that gender and race are “constructed” – not 
just the systems (patriarchy, white supremacy) organized around 
them, but what we take to be gender and race themselves – is thus 
perfectly accommodated. 
Rousseau deserves the credit for this too, though, as noted, the 
lack of discussion in the secondary literature of his class contract, 
and his own notorious sexism, means that he has not been fully 
recognized for it. As emphasized at the start, the social contract 
as it comes into its own in the modern period emphasizes the 
“artificiality” of society and the polity. These are human-made, not 
organic growths as in the discourse of antiquity, and the descriptive 
side of the contract expresses that insight. But Rousseau goes a 
startlingly radical step further: he suggests that in a sense humans 
themselves are artificial, human-created products. What to his 
predecessors were “natural” divisions of class he sees as a result 
of domination and convention. It is not merely that we make our 
institutions – we also make ourselves. 
And the implications are that for the domination contract 
in general, dramatic social transformation, both good and bad, 
is pivotal. In this respect it contrast with the more limited scope 
envisaged for changing ourselves in the mainstream contract. 
Hobbes sees humans as naturally self-seeking individuals who 
have to learn to constrain their propensity to maximization of 
short-term advantage for society to function. But this is not a 
radical metamorphosis. Nor are Lockean humans, who already 
largely obey natural law in the state of nature (though prone to 
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bias in their own case) dramatically altered by their entry into 
society. And for Kant’s Christian vision, of course, we are always 
characterized, as fallen humans, by our “radical evil,” whether 
in society or not. But Rousseau differs from his fellow-contract 
theorists in offering “a secular narrative of Fall” (Brooke 2001, 
110), in which “a corrupt society is the cause and a debased human 
nature the effect” (Hulliung 2001, 67).
Extended from class to gender and race, this gives us the 
sexual and racial contracts, which in a dialectical relationship both 
consolidate in an oppositional relationship with one another the 
entities of men and women, whites and nonwhites, and create these 
groups themselves. So the (bad) contractual transformation of the 
non-ideal descriptive domination contract is far more thoroughgoing 
than in the mainstream descriptive contract. It is social institutions 
that form and corrupt us, an account “locating the origins of evil not 
in any original sin by the First Couple but in the consequences of 
the organization of human societies“ (Brooke 2001, 111). And the 
implications for the (good) contractual transformation envisaged 
in the ideal prescriptive contract are, correspondingly, far more 
sweeping than in the mainstream version, since radical contract 
theory then points us toward the necessity not merely of dismantling 
these structures of domination, but the contractors themselves 
as intrinsically gendered and raced beings. As Marx envisaged a 
classless society, so the sexual and racial contracts, emphasizing the 
constructed nature of gender and race, open up for us the possibility 
and desirability of a genderless and raceless society.
4  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
I now want to consider some objections that might be made 
to this proposed revisionist contractualism.
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1. The “domination contract” is an idle fifth wheel, not doing any 
work, and not necessary to theorize normatively about these issues.
The claim is not that it’s necessary, but that it’s helpful, in 
pointing us toward and highlighting certain important realities not 
usually discussed in this framework, and which the mainstream 
contract apparatus tends to obfuscate. So it’s not a matter of logical 
implication but conceptual orientation, heuristic value, pointing 
us there rather than here. Besides, the “fifth wheel” accusation is 
standardly made about the Rawlsian contract also, so arguably the 
domination contract is no more vulnerable than it is.
2. “Contract” is just a metaphor, which doesn’t explain 
anything, and that goes for a “domination contract” also; what 
we need is empirically informed socio-political theory about the 
actual causal mechanisms of oppression. 
Many philosophers have long argued that metaphors do in fact 
do cognitive work. But in any case, the domination contract is no 
more meant to substitute for empirical socio-political investigation 
than the mainstream contract is. It’s not competing with such 
work but complementing it, providing at the level of abstraction 
appropriate to political philosophy an intellectual framework that 
can be utilized by theorists with widely differing views on what 
the causes of social oppression are, while remaining agnostic and 
uncommitted about which of these accounts is most convincing. So 
theorists with quite divergent perspectives can at least get together 
on this common minimalist platform.
3. Whether the contract is one of “domination” or not, 
endorsing this apparatus ties one to a liberal framework.
I see this as a virtue, not a weakness – a way of mainstreaming 
issues typically discussed only in radical circles, piggybacking on 
to a respectable apparatus (isn’t the goal of progressives to convert 
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others and not just preach to the choir?). Besides, while it endorses 
liberal values, it explicitly rejects the social ontology of atomic 
individuals usually associated with liberalism for an ontology of 
individuals as members of social groups. So it arguably retains 
the key insight of progressive theory, viz. the oppressive role of 
class, gender, and racial structures.
4. Liberal values themselves are suspect.
What’s the alternative? Besides, what’s wrong with moral 
equality, autonomy, self-realization, equality before the law, due 
process, freedom of expression, freedom of association, voting 
rights, and so forth? Sounds pretty good to me. The real problem 
historically has been the restricted extension of these values to 
a limited population, or the evacuation of nominal freedoms of 
any real substantive content by oppressive social structures. But 
the whole point of mapping a “domination contract” is to be able 
to track, and ultimately eliminate, these problems. Consider the 
alternatives: (i) Marxism: presently moribund in the absence of an 
attractive socialist project, historically weak on normative issues, 
and in any case arguably parasitic on liberal values for what little 
normative argumentation has been given in the tradition (for 
example, claims about liberal equality being undercut by class 
domination). (ii) Communitarianism: vulnerable to the charge of 
relativism, and in any case the backward-looking orientation of 
the dominant variety is particularly uncongenial for traditionally-
subordinated groups like women and racial minorities, for whom 
the “good old days” (coverture? slavery? colonialism?) were not so 
good at all, and are somewhat less likely to inspire nostalgia. (iii) 
Poststructuralism: famously better at deconstruction than positive 
reconstruction. Besides, if demands for gender and racial justice 
are conceptualized as just the will-to-power of the subordinated, 
how on earth will this legitimate them? (iv) Feminist ethic of 
“care”: many feminists have moved away from their original strong 
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endorsement of this alternative, conceding that even if (in some 
cases) we need more than justice, we do definitely need justice. 
5. Insofar as no political theorist (today) would exclude white 
women and people of color, mainstream social contract theory 
already takes their concerns into account.
One needs to distinguish substantive from merely formal, 
nominal inclusion. The well-established feminist critique made 
by Okin and others shows that just-adding-women-and-stirring, 
alternating “he’s” and “she’s” in the manuscript, doesn’t amount to 
a serious rethinking of the polity to achieve gender justice. Rawls’s 
own original notorious assumption that the family can be treated 
as an “ideal” institution, and the general ignoring in mainstream 
male literature of the difference gender makes, demonstrates the 
continuing marginalization of these concerns. And the situation on 
race is even worse: there is next to no recognition in the work on 
justice by white political philosophers that the United States and the 
former colonial powers have historically been white-supremacist 
polities, and that racial injustice has been central to their history. 
6. The critique of mainstream social contract theory is 
misplaced, since it’s not as if it’s trying and failing to do what you 
want it to do, but that (as an exercise in ideal theory, as you recognize 
at the start) it’s not trying to do what you want it to do at all.
If the task of political philosophy is to articulate ideals of a 
just society, then surely at some stage – even for ideal theory – the 
ultimate goal must be to bring these ideals into comparison with 
our own manifestly non-ideal society to see how to make it more 
just. (If this is not the intention, and these ideals are meant just 
for aesthetic contemplation, then this is a remarkable abdication 
of the historic role of ethical theory and its link with practical 
reason!) Rawls himself said that the point of starting with ideal 
theory was that it would give us a better grasp on the more pressing 
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problems of non-ideal theory. But as pointed out at the start, forty 
years later this promise remains largely unfulfilled. So it raises the 
question: are mainstream contract theorists really serious about 
social justice or not?
7. The origins of social contract theory in white male 
bourgeois thought necessarily contaminate its theoretical 
assumptions and the structuring of its crucial concepts, for 
example the “individual” will, in effect, necessarily be conceived 
of as a male property owner, with a wife at home to do reproductive 
labor. So this apparatus cannot be reclaimed and turned to 
progressive ends.
We need to distinguish (ineluctable) logical implication from 
(weaker) theoretical bias. The history of the “contract” shows it is 
flexible enough to be radicalized and subjected to reconceptualization, 
as in Rousseau, as cited, or Rawls on class disadvantage (where he 
is good), or Okin’s adaptation of Rawls as applied to the family. The 
task is to rethink (in the light of structures of domination) what would 
be necessary for the subordinated to realize their “individuality.” But 
this does not require abandonment of the concept, just an expanded 
vision of pertinent social obstacles – which is precisely what the 
“domination contract” sets out to highlight. 
8. By your own concession, the appeal and continuing survival 
of social contract theory are owed in part to its very simplicity as an 
image and metaphor. But this simplicity is lost once you start fuzzifying 
things with not one contract but several interlocking “contracts”. If 
all these complexities and epicycles are needed, isn’t the original 
metaphor lost, and shouldn’t the project just be abandoned?
Simplicity is undoubtedly a theoretical virtue, but not the 
only, or highest, one. More important is adequacy to the field of 
study. Society is complex, and while the original contract is easier 
to grasp, this comes at the cost of obfuscating and profoundly 
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misrepresenting the actual social history, and blinding us to 
pressing issues of social justice. Arguably the central insights of 
social contract theory are the human-created character of society 
and the polity, and the commitment (if originally limited) to moral 
egalitarianism. These insights are retained in the domination 
contract, though put on a more sociologically informed foundation. 
So I would claim that more is gained by complicating the contract 
idea than is lost by the relinquishment of simplicity. 
5  APPROPRIATING THE CONTRACT
My recommendation, then, is that we – egalitarians, feminists, 
critical race theorists, and progressives in general in political theory 
who are concerned about real social justice issues – work toward 
a paradigm shift in contract theory, not conceding the contract to 
mainstream theorists, but seeking to appropriate it and turn it to 
emancipatory ends. According to the Kymlicka (1991, 196) quote 
cited earlier, contract is really just a “device which many different 
traditions have used for many different reasons.” Rawls (1971, 
21), similarly, sometimes refers to his updating of the contract 
(the veil, the original position) as an “expository device.” So given 
this essentially instrumental identity of the contract, there is no 
principled barrier to developing it in a radical way: the domination 
contract as an “expository device” for non-ideal theory. Once 
one recognizes how protean the contract has historically been, 
and how politically pivotal is its insight of the human creation of 
society and of ourselves as social beings, one should be able to 
appreciate that its conservative deployment is a result not of its 
intrinsic features, but of its use by a privileged white male group 
hegemonic in political theory who have had no motivation to 
extrapolate its logic. Far from being a necessarily bourgeois or 
necessarily sexist or necessarily racist apparatus, contract theory 
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has a radical potential barely tapped, and can serve as a vehicle 
for translating into conventional discourse most, if not all, of the 
crucial claims of radical democratic political theory. 
The key conceptual move is simply to strip away the 
assumptions and corresponding conceptual infrastructure of 
an individualism once restricted to bourgeois white males and 
still shaping the contract’s features today, and replace it with an 
ontology of groups (Young 1990; Cudd 2006). Rousseau’s class 
contract, Pateman’s sexual contract, my racial contract (ideally 
combined, of course), can all then be conceptualized as still 
being within the contract tradition in the minimal defining sense 
outlined above, viz., the assertion of, indeed insistence upon, the 
historic role of human causality in shaping the polity, and the 
commitment to the substantive realization of moral egalitarianism 
in its necessary transformation. By contrast, the assumptions of 
the mainstream contract in its contemporary form, presuming 
universal inclusion and general input, handicap the apparatus in 
tackling the necessary task of corrective justice by, in a sense, 
assuming the very thing that needs to be substantively achieved. 
Once one adds women of all races, and male people of color (to 
say nothing of the white male working class), one is actually 
talking about the majority of the population’s being excluded in 
one way or another from the historical contract, and its present 
descendant! A theoretical device whose classic pretensions are to 
represent universal socio-political inclusion actually captures the 
experience of just a minority of the population, since inequality 
has not been the exception but the norm in modern societies. 
Far from the domination contract representing “minority” 
concerns, then, it actually provides an accurate depiction of the 
situation for the majority. And far from being anti-Enlightenment, 
it has a much better claim to be carrying on the Enlightenment 
legacy. Getting the facts right is supposed to be an essential part 
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of the Enlightenment mission, and in its mystified picture of the 
origins and workings of modern polities, mainstream contract theory 
certainly does not do that. And if the Enlightenment is supposed 
to be committed to moral egalitarianism and a transformation of 
society to realize this imperative, then ignoring the ways in which 
class, gender, and race void nominal egalitarianism of substance is 
hardly the way to achieve such equality. Through the more accurate 
descriptive mapping of the domination contract, the emancipatory 
reach of the egalitarianism of the prescriptive contract can then gain 
its full leveling scope rather than being, as at present, effectively 
confined to achieving the freedom and equality of a few. 
In sum, a case can be made that radical contract theory, which 
deploys the domination contract as its descriptive mapping device, 
is, far from being a theoretical usurper, the true heir to the social 
contract tradition at its best, and it is mainstream contract theory 
that has betrayed its promise. If war is too important to be left to the 
generals, one could say that social contract theory is too important 
to be left to the social contract theorists. We should reclaim it. 
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